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I.  INTRODUCTION 
With over 750 million active users worldwide,1 Facebook has quickly 
become one of the most highly trafficked websites in the world.2  Translated 
into more than seventy languages,3 and with 70% of user access occurring 
outside of the United States,4 the site has truly become an international 
sensation.  As of July 2011, Facebook was worth an estimated $84 billion.5  
Along with others like MySpace, LinkedIn, and Twitter, the site has fueled 
the social networking revolution that is helping to define the new 
millennium.   
Facebook’s popularity, however, has not come without a price for its 
users.  Although membership is up, privacy control is down.6  As more and 
more users have joined the site, Facebook has decreased the amount of 
control users have over their personal data.  This is particularly troublesome 
given the breadth of personal information that the site encourages users to 
make available (including photos, religious views, hometown, and address)7 
and the growing circle of third-party websites and application developers that 
can access much of this sensitive user information.8 
Threats to user privacy have not gone unnoticed.  Outcry over Facebook’s 
privacy policies has echoed worldwide, backed by privacy advocates and a 
number of lawmakers.9  As Facebook rapidly grows,10 though, existing 
privacy and technology laws struggle to keep up with its innovations.11   
                                                                                                                   
 1 Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited July 
23, 2011) (document on file with author).  
 2 Factsheet, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?factsheet (last visited July 
23, 2011) (document on file with author). 
 3 Statistics, supra note 1. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Shayndi Raice, Is His Company Worth $100 Billion?, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2011, at B1. 
 6 See infra Part II.B (explaining how Facebook’s privacy protections have weakened over 
time).  
 7 See infra Parts II.B–C (describing the types of personal information that Facebook 
encourages users to share and makes publicly available).  
 8 See infra Parts II.B–C (describing the types of personal user information that applications 
can access through Facebook). 
 9 See infra Parts III.C, IV.A (illustrating some of the legal action thus far initiated against 
Facebook).  
 10 James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1145 (2009) 
(“Facebook’s pace of innovation is so blisteringly fast that it’s not uncommon to log into the 
site and see that part of the interface has changed overnight to offer a new feature.”). 
 11 Miguel Helft & Claire Cain Miller, Web Outruns Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, 
at A1; see also OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN., PRIVACY, TRUST AND INNOVATION—
BUILDING CANADA’S DIGITAL ADVANTAGE 3–6 (2010), available at http://www.priv.gc.ca/infor 
 
278 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:275 
 
To date, Canadian law has proven one of the most effective tools for 
protecting user privacy on Facebook.12  In 2009, the Canadian Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner (OPC or Commissioner) declared that Facebook 
violated Canada’s private sector privacy law, the Personal Information and 
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).13  The OPC then successfully 
pressured Facebook to give users more knowledge and control regarding the 
site’s use of users’ personal information.14  Significantly, because the site is 
transnational, the Facebook challenge allowed an ordinarily domestic law to 
provoke change on a massive international scale.15  Privacy protections 
improved for users worldwide.16   
Yet Facebook still has work to do.  Since Facebook’s work with the 
Commissioner, the site has continued to grow in ways that reveal its 
compliance with Canada’s PIPEDA has not been as meaningful as it could 
and should be.17  Users still do not have enough control over what 
information they share.  They are also still not fully informed about what 
information they are sharing with third-party websites and application 
developers.18  In July 2010, an Internet security consultant published 
personal data he collected from 100 million Facebook users.19  The 
publication aimed to raise public awareness about the lack of user privacy on 
the site.20  The amount of personal information compiled astounded users and 
                                                                                                                   
mation/pub/sub_de_201007_e.pdf (explaining the tension between technological innovation and 
privacy protections).  
 12 See Facebook Faces Up to Long-Awaited Privacy Upgrades, 28 WESTLAW J. COMPUTER 
& INTERNET, Aug. 4, 2010, at 10, 10 (“Facebook users now have greater control over how 
much of their personal information is disclosed . . . . The changes were made in response to 
complaints from users, civil rights groups and governments, particularly Canada’s privacy 
commissioner.”). 
 13 See infra Part IV.A (detailing the OPC’s finding that Facebook was in violation of 
PIPEDA). 
 14 See infra Part IV.B (explaining Facebook’s improvements to user privacy that resulted 
from the OPC’s findings). 
 15 See Christine A. Carron & Martha A. Healey, Privacy Laws and Regulations Around the 
Globe: The Impact on Doing Business Internationally, 28 ACC DOCKET, Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 
S8, S9 (“Facebook recently indicated that it plans to amend worldwide practices to implement 
Canadian privacy requirements globally.”).  
 16 Id.  
 17 See infra Part V.A (explaining how Facebook is currently not in compliance with 
PIPEDA).  
 18 See infra Part V.B (giving examples of information sharing that likely occurs without full 
user consent).  
 19 Daniel Emery, Details of 100m Facebook Users Collected and Published, BBC NEWS 
(July 28, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-10796584. 
 20 Id. 
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advocates worldwide, leaving many asking—Should the default setting for 
information sharing on Facebook be quite so “social”? 
This Note argues that sharing should not be quite so extensive on 
Facebook, at least in certain situations.  Until Facebook gives users more 
meaningful control over their personal information and offers clearer, more 
specific disclosure of who has access to such information and how it is being 
used (particularly by third-party websites and applications), the site will 
continue to be out of step with Canada’s PIPEDA and users’ reasonable 
privacy expectations.  Specifically, the site should: (1) ask permission before 
adding new features or settings that make user information more public than 
it was before, (2) offer users more information on how and why their 
information is being used by third parties, and (3) give users more control 
over their sharing with third parties.21 
To accomplish these goals, Facebook must move closer to an “opt-in” 
privacy control model.  An opt-in model is one that does not assume users’ 
consent to sharing their information in new or more expansive ways without 
explicitly asking permission. Currently the site is built around an “opt-out” 
privacy control model.22  This opt-out model assumes that users agree to new 
privacy settings or information-sharing features and adds them to users’ 
accounts automatically.23  User information is then shared until the user 
expressly opts-out of sharing.24  Under an opt-in model, Facebook would 
have to ask a user’s permission first.25  
Given Canada’s strong privacy law framework and the political will that 
enabled the OPC’s recent success against Facebook, the country is in a 
strong position to further push the site toward an opt-in model in compliance 
with PIPEDA.  PIPEDA’s second mandated review is also set for 2011,26 
                                                                                                                   
 21 See infra Part V.B (explaining recommendations for Facebook in detail).  
 22 See infra notes 49−51 and accompanying text (explaining Facebook’s opt-out privacy 
model).  
 23 See infra notes 49−51 and accompanying text (explaining Facebook’s opt-out privacy 
model).  
 24 See infra notes 49−51 and accompanying text (explaining Facebook’s opt-out privacy 
model). 
 25 Determining the Appropriate Form of Consent Under the Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, OFF. PRIVACY COMM’R CAN., http://www.priv.gc. 
ca/fs-fi/02_05_d_24_e.cfm (last modified Sept. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Consent Under 
PIPEDA]. 
 26 See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 
§ 29(1) (Can.) [hereinafter PIPEDA], available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/P-8.6.pdf 
(“The administration of this Part shall, every five years after this Part comes into force, be 
reviewed by the committee of the House of Commons, or of both Houses of Parliament, that 
may be designated or established by Parliament for that purpose.”). 
280 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:275 
 
which will allow Canadian lawmakers to take an even closer look at the law.  
Lawmakers can then more effectively strengthen protections to combat 
online privacy challenges as needed. 
To this end, part II of this Note provides a brief history of Facebook and 
an overview of its problematic privacy policies to demonstrate the origin of 
the key privacy issues.  Part III examines Canada’s PIPEDA, providing an 
overview of the privacy law and how it applies to Facebook generally.  Part 
IV explains the Commissioner’s success in using PIPEDA to pressure 
Facebook to make specific changes to protect user privacy.  Part V argues 
that, despite changes, the site continues to violate PIPEDA principles and 
gives recommendations for modifying Facebook policies regarding privacy 
controls and third-party policies.  Part VI concludes that Canada should re-
launch an investigation of Facebook and pressure the site to incorporate 
changes that would put Facebook into compliance with PIPEDA and protect 
user privacy worldwide. 
II.  FACEBOOK AND ITS PRIVACY CHALLENGES: A BRIEF HISTORY 
A.  Facebook Is Born 
Facebook was created in a Harvard University dorm room in 2004.27  
Initially dubbed “TheFacebook,” the site was designed to help Harvard 
students share photos and communicate with their friends.28  Within a month 
it was released to other universities and, by 2006, it was available to anyone 
with a functional e-mail address.29  Facebook is now the number one social 
networking site in the world, and the most visited website in the world.30  
Facebook describes itself as a “social utility that helps people 
communicate more efficiently with their friends, family and coworkers.”31  It 
has two fundamental interfaces or features: a member’s profile and a 
member’s home page.32  The profile is customizable to feature anything from 
one’s basic personal information to religious, sexual, or political preferences 
                                                                                                                   
 27 Timeline, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?timeline (last visited July 
23, 2011) (document on file with author). 
 28 Don Reisinger, Facebook Six Years Later: From a Dorm Room Experiment to a 
Household Name, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2010), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/201 
0/02/facebook-six-years-later-from-a-dorm-room-to-a-household-name.html. 
 29 Timeline, supra note 27. 
 30 The 1000 Most-Visited Sites on the Web, GOOGLE (July 2011), http://www.google.com/ad 
planner/static/top1000/. 
 31 Factsheet, supra note 2.  
 32 Id. 
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(all categories are suggested by the site and a user can choose whether to 
share the information).33  Profiles also allow members to post pictures of 
themselves and of others.34  Under this photo-sharing system, if a user clicks 
on a face in any photo posted on Facebook—even one posted by someone 
else—that user can enter any name to identify the face in the photo.35  If the 
identified or “tagged” person is a Facebook user, the photo then also appears 
in the “tagged” user’s personal profile.36  Users can always “untag” 
themselves from a photo if they do not wish to be identified by name in that 
particular photo.  Finally, users can also write public “posts,” or messages, 
on one another’s profile pages.37  
The home page allows users to send private messages or to chat live with 
one another.38  Its main feature, however, is a “News Feed” that keeps a 
running tab of any changes users’ friends have made to their profiles, such as 
new groups, social events, or photos.39  The News Feed also publishes up-to-
date “statuses” of Facebook users.40  For example, if Facebook user John 
Doe is going to Target to buy a new pair of socks and wants to notify his 
entire online friend network and allow them to comment, he can do so by 
posting a status update on Facebook.  That update will appear both on his 
profile page and his friends’ home pages.  
                                                                                                                   
 33 Set up a Profile, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?guide=set_up_profile (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2010) (document on file with author).  
 34 See Justin Mitchell, Making Photo Tagging Easier, FACEBOOK BLOG, http://blog.facebo 
ok.com/blog.php?post=467145887130 (last updated June 30, 2011) (illustrating the photo-
tagging feature). 
 35 Tag Photos, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/photos/tag-photos (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2011) (document on file with author) (offering a basic overview of the tagging 
feature on Facebook).  
 36 Id. 
 37 Explore Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?guide=explore_facebook 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2010) (document on file with author). 
 38 Nick O’Neill, The New Facebook Home Page Guide That You Must Read, ALL 
FACEBOOK: THE UNOFFICIAL FACEBOOK RESOURCE (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.allfacebook. 
com/facebook-home-page-2010-02 (giving a general overview of the Facebook Home Page); 
Messages Basics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/messages/basics (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2011) (document on file with author) (explaining the basics of sending private 
messages on Facebook); Basics: How to Chat, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/ 
chat/how-to-chat (last visited Nov. 24, 2011) (document on file with author) (explaining the 
basics of chatting on Facebook).   
 39 Explore Facebook, supra note 37.   
 40 Id.   
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Users build online friend networks by sending “friend requests” to one 
another.41  A friend request can be accepted or rejected once received.42  As 
of June 2011, the average Facebook user had 130 friends.43 
Facebook also features a “Platform,” or interface that allows developers 
to create different “applications” or “apps” for use on the Facebook site.44  
Applications are software that allow Facebook users to play games and share 
common interests.45  The applications range from games like hangman or 
scrabble to online celebrity quizzes, horoscopes, and classified ads.46  
Independent third-party developers can create applications, and the Platform 
feature enables those third parties to plug their applications into the 
Facebook site and present them to users with the Facebook look and feel.47  
As of October 2010, there are about 550,000 applications on the site, and 
70% of Facebook users interact with at least one each month.48  
B.  Privacy Settings: Less Is More? 
Facebook uses an opt-out model to protect user privacy on the site.49  This 
means the site generally presumes a user’s consent to share her information 
with the largest possible audience unless she deliberately opts-out.50  When 
the site’s privacy settings change or a new feature is added that requires more 
information sharing, Facebook automatically applies the new settings or 
                                                                                                                   
 41 Adding Friends & Friend Requests, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=7 
67 (last visited July 24, 2011) (document on file with author) (expand the “How do I add a 
Friend?” hyperlink). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Statistics, supra note 1. 
 44 Facebook Platform, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/platform?v=info (last visited 
July 24, 2011) (document on file with author). 
 45 See generally App Directory, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/apps/directory.php 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2010) (document on file with author) (featuring examples of different 
applications on the site).  
 46 Id. 
 47 Grimmelmann, supra note 10, at 1146. 
 48 Emily Steel & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook in Privacy Breach—Top-Ranked 
Applications Transmit Personal IDs, a Journal Investigation Finds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 
2010, at A1. 
 49 Alexei Alexis, House Panel Examines Privacy Concerns Surrounding Social Networking 
Websites, 15 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 1211 (2010).  Michael Merritt, assistant director of 
the Office of Investigations at the Secret Service, stated that “ ‘Facebook has changed its 
privacy controls several times, usually setting users’ default preferences to maximum 
exposure, making users take the initiative to navigate the controls to restrict who may view 
their information.’ ”  Id.   
 50 Id. 
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shares user information without asking permission first.51  As a result, users 
are more exposed to wider and wider circles of viewers.  
To illustrate the privacy implications of this model, a hypothetical is 
useful.  Imagine that the above Target shopper, John Doe, initially set up his 
Facebook account in 2005.  Imagine further that he did so using the site’s 
recommended, default privacy settings and made no adjustments to these 
privacy settings for five years.  In 2005, John’s profile information (photos, 
posts, and relationship status) is strictly available to other users that he has 
pre-designated on the site.52  In fact, the site’s privacy policy promises John 
it will not share his information with “ ‘any user of the Web Site who does 
not belong to at least one of the groups specified by you in your privacy 
settings.’ ”53  The site has roughly 5.5 million active users.54 
 By 2007, however, Facebook applies new privacy settings that make 
John’s once-protected information automatically available not only to his 
“friends,” but to any Facebook user who is in his school network or 
registered in his geographic area.55  A larger pool of users can see John’s 
personal information regardless of whether John knows those users or they 
are his Facebook friends.  By this time Facebook’s user pool has jumped to 
50 million.56   
By November 2009, many of John’s listed details, including his name, 
profile photo, friend list, city, and home address,57 become available not only 
to users on Facebook, but to anyone searching the Internet, irrespective of 
Facebook membership.  John’s heightened exposure results from new 
Facebook policies that made his profile details mandatorily Publicly 
                                                                                                                   
 51 Id. 
 52 Kurt Opsahl, Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline.   
 53 Id. (quoting Facebook). 
 54 Timeline, supra note 27. 
 55 Opsahl, supra note 52 (“ ‘Profile information you submit to Facebook will be available to 
users of Facebook who belong to at least one of the networks you allow to access the 
information through your privacy settings (e.g., school, geography, friends of friends).  Your 
name, school name, and profile picture thumbnail will be available in search results across the 
Facebook network unless you alter your privacy settings.’ ” (quoting Facebook)).   
 56 Timeline, supra note 27. 
 57 Opsahl, supra note 52 (“ ‘Information set to “everyone” is publicly available 
information, may be accessed by everyone on the Internet (including people not logged into 
Facebook), is subject to indexing by third party search engines, may be associated with you 
outside of Facebook (such as when you visit other sites on the internet), and may be imported 
and exported by us and others without privacy limitations.  The default privacy setting for 
certain types of information you post on Facebook is set to “everyone.” ’ ” (quoting 
Facebook)). 
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Available Information (PAI).58  Facebook now exceeds 300 million active 
users.59 
In December 2009, John Doe’s PAI becomes accessible not only to other 
individuals on the Internet, but also to third-party applications and 
Facebook’s partner websites.60  Before this date, users could opt-out of 
sharing their personal data with application developers.61  After the creation 
of the PAI category, however, this opt-out option disappeared.62  Now if 
John plays a game of “Hangman” on Facebook, or takes a survey querying, 
“which ‘80s child actor are you?” he then (likely unwittingly) grants that 
application developer unrestricted access to his personal information.63  
Further, even if John never uses applications, the applications used by John’s 
friends still have unrestricted access to his data.64  
Finally, by April 2011, if John visits one of Facebook’s partner websites, 
like Pandora Radio or the online directory Yelp,65 Facebook’s new Instant 
Personalization application gives that site access to some of his 
information.66  John might log into Pandora, for example, and be surprised to 
see a list of his Facebook friends, accompanied by a link offering him access 
to those friends’ Pandora playlists.67  Like other new Facebook features, the 
                                                                                                                   
 58 Jane E. Kirtley, Privacy Protection, Safety and Security, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 2010, at 15, 122 (PLI Intell. Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 1027, 2010).  
 59 Timeline, supra note 27. 
 60 Opsahl, supra note 52 (“ ‘Certain categories of information such as your name, profile 
photo, list of friends and pages you are a fan of, gender, geographic region, and networks you 
belong to are considered publicly available to everyone, including Facebook-enhanced 
applications, and therefore do not have privacy settings.’ ” (quoting Facebook)).  
 61 Kirtley, supra note 58, at 123. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Facebook Sprung From Penalty Box by Canadian Privacy Czar, 28 WESTLAW J. 
COMPUTER & INTERNET, Sept. 29, 2010, at 11, 11. 
 64 Steel & Fowler, supra note 48.  
 65 See Instant Personalization, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/instantpersonalization/ 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (document on file with author) (listing Yelp, Pandora, and 
Facebook’s other Instant Personalization partner sites); see also Chris Morrison, A Look at 
Facebook’s Three Instant Personalization Partners: Yelp, Pandora, Docs.com, INSIDE 
FACEBOOK (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.insidefacebook.com/2010/04/27/a-look-at-facebooks-thr 
ee-instant-personalization-partners-yelp-pandora-docs-com/ (explaining Facebook’s partnership 
with Yelp and Pandora). 
 66 See Controlling How You Share, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/privacy/explanat 
ion.php (last visited July 24, 2011) (document on file with author) (generally explaining the 
Instant Personalization feature); see also Rose v. Facebook, Inc., No. CA 10-232 S, 2010 WL 
2147928, paras. 1–5 (D.R.I. filed May 21, 2010) (explaining legally problematic aspects of 
Instant Personalization feature).  
 67 Morrison, supra note 65 (“[T]here’s an option called Friends’ Music [on Pandora]. 
Clicking on this gives you a large box showing each [Facebook] friend and allowing you to 
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Instant Personalization application was added automatically, without John’s 
permission.68  At this point, Facebook has over 350 million active users.69  
C.  Opting-Out: A Meaningful Method of Privacy Control? 
At any point, of course, John could choose to opt-out of much of this 
sharing by adjusting his privacy settings to restrict how much of his 
information is shared with others.70  Facebook’s Privacy Settings feature 
enables users to limit, in many cases, the accessibility of their private 
information.71  The privacy settings page lists different categories of user 
information and allows the user to scale back from sharing a given category 
of information with “Everyone” to “Friends of Friends” or “Friends only.”72  
For example, in 2007, when John’s details became available to all users, 
he could have visited his privacy settings and indicated that he did not want 
his profile information to be available to anyone other than friends.73  Again 
in November 2009, he could have visited his privacy settings page and opted 
out of the public search feature so that his details were not available to third-
party search engines and non-Facebook Internet users.74  As of December 
2009, there was nothing John could have done to avoid sharing certain 
information with his friends’ applications.75  Within several months, 
however, he would have the option to revisit his privacy settings and turn off 
the Platform feature entirely to avoid any unwanted sharing with 
applications.76  
                                                                                                                   
navigate through to look at their music and, if you’d care to, listen to their stations.”). 
 68 Id. (“The [Instant Personalization] service requires each partner site to display a 
prominent blue scroll-down bar allowing users to instantly opt-out. If users don’t choose to 
opt out, the partner continues to be able to access general information.”). 
 69 Timeline, supra note 27. 
 70 See generally Facebook Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php 
(last visited July 24, 2011) (document on file with author) (explaining how users can control 
their sharing). 
 71 Choose Your Privacy Settings, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/settings/?tab=privacy 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2010) (document on file with author). 
 72 Controlling How You Share, supra note 66. 
 73 Opsahl, supra note 52 (“ ‘Your name, school name, and profile picture thumbnail will be 
available in search results across the Facebook network unless you alter your privacy 
settings.’ ” (quoting Facebook)). 
 74 PAI, however, would still be mandatorily available to other Facebook users.  Kirtley, 
supra note 58, at 123; see generally Opsahl, supra note 52 (“ ‘The default privacy setting for 
certain types of information you post on Facebook is set to “everyone.”  You can review and 
change the default settings in your privacy settings.’ ” (quoting Facebook)). 
 75 Steel & Fowler, supra note 48. 
 76 Mark Zuckerberg, Making Control Simple, FACEBOOK BLOG (May 26, 2010), http://blog. 
 
286 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:275 
 
Facebook’s manual opt-out method has a number of downsides for users.  
Namely, it puts the burden of privacy control on the user rather than on the 
site because users have to ask (via the privacy controls) the site to stop 
sharing their information rather than the site having to ask users’ permission 
first.77  This is problematic for several reasons.  First, users do not always 
know when their information is being shared in new or undesired ways.  
Facebook does not always alert users of privacy changes or new features.  
When it does, Facebook’s updates have been criticized as inadequate and 
untimely.78  For example, if John did not visit Pandora after December 2009 
and realize the Instant Personalization feature existed, he would likely be 
unaware that such information sharing with the site was ever authorized to 
occur.  Without knowledge of a new feature, John cannot know to turn it off.   
Moreover, even when a user does learn of a new feature and chooses to 
opt-out, that user can only do so after the unwanted sharing has occurred. 
Even the most privacy-literate and diligent users, then, still cannot prevent 
unwanted information sharing entirely.  According to a class-action lawsuit 
pending in the United States, Facebook’s method of adding new applications 
and sharing user information with third-party sites without prior consent, as 
Instant Personalization does, is a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in contract79 and a violation of the federal Stored 
Communications Act.80  
Second, Facebook’s privacy settings and privacy policy have been 
criticized as unnecessarily complex and obscure.81  Even if John becomes 
aware that he is over-sharing his information and wants to make changes, he 
may not be able to figure out how to do so.  As of May 12, 2010, users would 
have to comprehend a 5,830 word policy—longer than the U.S. Constitution 
absent amendments—and wade through 170 options to make their 
                                                                                                                   
facebook.com/blog.php?post=391922327130. 
 77 See supra notes 49−51 and accompanying text (explaining Facebook’s opt-out privacy 
model).  
 78 See Rose v. Facebook, Inc., No. CA 10-232 S, 2010 WL 2147928, paras. 2−3 (D.R.I. 
filed May 21, 2010) (“Facebook . . . broadcasts users’ personal information through the 
network unless users affirmatively opt-out. . . . Facebook did not adequately warn users that 
their information would be posted to unrelated third party websites. . . . Therefore, Facebook, 
without permission, shared information about users with unrelated third party websites.”); see 
also infra Part IV.A (detailing the allegations against Facebook). 
 79 Rose, 2010 WL 2147928, paras. 24−31. 
 80 Id. paras. 17−23; Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701–2712 (2006). 
 81 Facebook Faces Up to Long-Awaited Privacy Upgrades, supra note 12, at 10 (“The site 
faced complaints that the settings were too complex and made it too easy to inadvertently 
disclose personal information.”). 
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information as private as possible.82  Thus, the opt-out options that do exist 
may be less meaningful because of the time and energy it takes for users to 
understand and exercise those options.  Users may inadvertently “agree” to 
share information they did not intend to share.83 
Finally, there are limits on a user’s ability to stop sharing certain 
information, even if the user wants to make the information private.84  A 
prime example is the PAI category, which makes certain user information 
mandatorily available.85  Several prominent privacy advocacy groups have 
already petitioned Facebook to eliminate the PAI category and give users 
full, “true control” over who sees their personal information.86  
Given the drawbacks of Facebook’s opt-out privacy control system, many 
privacy advocates and lawmakers have urged the site to shift to an opt-in 
model to give users more meaningful control over their information.87  Using 
Canada’s privacy law, PIPEDA, the Commissioner played an instrumental 
role in pressuring the site to move closer to such a model in May 2010.88 
                                                                                                                   
 82 Nick Bilton, Price of Facebook Privacy? Start Clicking, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at B8.  
 83 Facebook Faces Up to Long-Awaited Privacy Upgrades, supra note 12. 
 84 See infra notes 209−16 and accompanying text (explaining the limits to the control users 
have over what information they share through Facebook applications).  
 85 Kirtley, supra note 58, at 123. 
 86 Open Letter to Facebook: More Privacy Improvements Needed, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND. (June 16, 2010), http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2010/06/16 [hereinafter Open 
Letter to Facebook].  
 87 James G. Gatto & Seth A. Metsch, Legal Issues with Virtual Worlds, Virtual Goods and 
Virtual Currencies, in TECHNOLOGY AND ENTERTAINMENT CONVERGENCE 2010, at 837, 865 (PLI 
Intell. Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 1016, 2010); Press Release, Charles E. Schumer, U.S. 
Sen., et al., Schumer, Bennet, Franken, Begich Ask Facebook to Fix Privacy Policy to Keep 
Users’ Data Private from Third-Party Websites—Facebook’s Recent Decision to Share Personal 
Info Raises Major Privacy Concerns for Millions of Americans (Apr. 27, 2010), available at 
http://schumer.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=324226&; Rose v. Facebook, Inc., No. CA 10-232 S, 
2010 WL 2147928, para. 30 (D.R.I. filed May 21, 2010) (alleging legal violations relating to 
aspects of Facebook’s current privacy model); Open Letter to Facebook, supra note 86; 
Facebook Reveals ‘Simplified’ Privacy Changes, BBC NEWS (May 26, 2010), http://www.bbc. 
co.uk/news/10167143 (quoting Simon Davies, director of Privacy International as stating that 
“[t]he vast majority of people don’t use privacy settings so the reforms are not likely to have as 
great an impact . . . . If the default is for less information then we’ve really made a step 
forward.”). 
 88 See Facebook Faces Up to Long-Awaited Privacy Upgrades, supra note 12, at 10 
(“Facebook users now have greater control over how much of their personal information is 
disclosed . . . . The changes were made in response to complaints from users, civil rights 
groups and governments, particularly Canada’s privacy commissioner.”).  
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III.  CANADA’S PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC 
DOCUMENTS ACT (PIPEDA): AN OVERVIEW 
A.  Purpose and Scope 
In July 2009, the Commissioner released a report declaring Facebook in 
violation of Canada’s private sector privacy law, PIPEDA.89  Signed into law 
on April 13, 2000,90 PIPEDA was designed to protect Canadians’ privacy in 
the new technological age of electronic storage, e-mail, and Internet91 while 
still encouraging the free flow of data across borders.92  PIPEDA’s privacy 
model is premised on knowledge and consent.93  PIPEDA thus seeks to 
protect an individual’s personal information from being shared in ways that 
the individual does not know about or consent to.94  When the Commissioner 
found aspects of Facebook in violation of PIPEDA in 2009, the cause was 
essentially for over-sharing users’ personal information in unauthorized or 
undisclosed ways.95  
                                                                                                                   
 89 ELIZABETH DENHAM, REPORT OF FINDINGS INTO THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE CANADIAN 
INTERNET POLICY AND PUBLIC INTEREST CLINIC (CIPPIC) AGAINST FACEBOOK INC. UNDER THE 
PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS ACT (2009), available at 
http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2009/2009_008_0716_e.pdf. 
 90 PIPEDA, supra note 26.  The Act was actually implemented in phases over a three-year 
period beginning on January 1, 2001.  OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN., LEADING BY 
EXAMPLE: KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIRST SEVEN YEARS OF THE PERSONAL INFORMATION 
PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS ACT (PIPEDA) 1 (2008) [hereinafter LEADING BY 
EXAMPLE], available at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/privcom/IP54-6-20 
08E.pdf.   
 91 PIPEDA, supra note 26, § 3. 
 92 See OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_ 
2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited July 24, 2011) (“Privacy protection laws 
have been introduced . . . to prevent . . . violations of fundamental human rights, such as the 
unlawful storage of personal data, the storage of inaccurate personal data, or the abuse or 
unauthorised disclosure of such data. . . . Restrictions on these flows could cause serious 
disruption in important sectors of the economy . . . .”).  
 93 DENHAM, supra note 89, at 3 (“The central issue in CIPPIC’s allegations was knowledge 
and consent.  [The OPC] focused its investigation on whether Facebook was providing a 
sufficient knowledge basis for meaningful consent by documenting purposes for collecting, 
using, or disclosing personal information and bringing such purposes to individuals’ attention 
in a reasonably direct and transparent way.”). 
 94 According to the OPC, the type of consent that must be given depends on the sensitivity 
of the information.  The OPC differentiates between “Positive/Opt-in (Express) Consent” and 
a “Negative/Opt-out Mechanism.”  Consent Under PIPEDA, supra note 25. 
 95 See infra Part IV.A (explaining in more detail the Commissioner’s findings regarding 
Facebook’s use of users’ personal information).  
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PIPEDA generally requires an organization to get a person’s consent96 
before it can collect, use, or disclose his personal information.97  Even if an 
organization gets consent from an individual, use or disclosure of that 
individual’s personal information is limited to the purposes to which that 
person consented.98  Organizations must also limit the collection, use, and 
disclosure of a person’s information to “purposes that a reasonable person 
would consider appropriate under the circumstances.”99  Finally, an 
individual also has the right to see the personal information that a given 
business has about that individual.100  
PIPEDA is based on ten guiding principles: (1) accountability, (2) 
identifying purposes, (3) consent, (4) limiting collection, (5) limiting use, 
disclosure, and retention, (6) accuracy, (7) safeguards, (8) openness, (9) 
individual access, and (10) challenging compliance.101  According to the 
principle of “accountability,” an organization must protect personal 
information it holds or transfers to third parties, and ensure that personal 
information practices and policies are developed and implemented.102  
According to “identifying purposes,” an organization must identify why it is 
collecting personal information and how it will be used.103  “Consent” and 
“limiting collection” require an organization to honestly and meaningfully 
inform an individual and obtain consent for collection; the latter also requires 
limiting the information collected to what is necessary.104  “Limiting use, 
disclosure and retention” puts limits on the use, disclosure, and length of 
retention of personal information, and “accuracy” encourages organizations 
to ensure that information is as accurate as possible before using or 
disclosing it.105  “Safeguards” requires an organization to protect people’s 
                                                                                                                   
 96 In certain cases, police may be exempt from the consent requirement under PIPEDA.  
Organizations that collect, use, or disclose personal information for solely journalistic, 
literary, or artistic purposes are also exempt.  OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN., YOUR 
GUIDE TO PIPEDA 4 (2009) [hereinafter YOUR GUIDE TO PIPEDA], available at http://www. 
priv.gc.ca/information/02_05_d_08_e.pdf. 
 97 Complying with the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 
OFF. PRIVACY COMM’R CAN., http://www.priv.gc.ca/fs-fi/02_05_d_16_e.cfm (last modified 
June 20, 2005). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See ASS’N XPERTISE, THE PIPEDA PRIVACY PRINCIPLES 2−7 (2001), available at http:// 
www.axi.ca/resdocs/privacy_guide.pdf (outlining each of the principles in detail). 
 102 Id. at 2. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 3. 
 105 Id. at 4. 
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information from loss, theft, or unauthorized uses.106  “Openness” refers to 
informing individuals of the organization’s policies regarding personal 
information in a meaningful way.107  Finally, “individual access” requires 
organizations to give people access to see and correct their own information, 
and “challenging compliance” requires organizations to develop a simple and 
accessible complaint process for those who feel their privacy has been 
violated.108 
B.  Who Is Covered and How Facebook Fits 
For PIPEDA to apply,109 the information at issue must be “personal”110 
and the allegedly unauthorized use, disclosure, or collection of that 
information must occur in the course of “commercial activity.”111  Personal 
information is defined as “information about an identifiable individual.”112  
Currently, details such as a person’s name, race, religion, marital status, 
education, email address, physical characteristics, medical information, 
income, spending habits, tax returns, and other identification numbers, like 
one’s Social Insurance Number, all qualify as personal information under 
PIPEDA.113  This definition is fluid, though, as it is largely shaped by case 
law.114  
Many PIPEDA cases turn on whether the information at issue is “capable 
of identifying” the individual.115  In one case, the Assistant Commissioner 
concluded a property manager violated PIPEDA when he photographed 
                                                                                                                   
 106 Id. at 5. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 6–7. 
 109 Another threshold issue is that the Act applies only to an “organization,” defined as “an 
association, a partnership, a person and a trade union,” therefore, Facebook easily qualified.  
PIPEDA, supra note 26, § 2(1).  
 110 Id. (defining “personal information”). 
 111 Id. (defining “commercial activity” broadly as “any particular transaction, act . . . course 
of conduct that is of a commercial character). 
 112 Id. (noting also that personal information “does not include the name, title or business 
address or telephone number of an employee of an organization”). 
 113 YOUR GUIDE TO PIPEDA, supra note 96, at 2.  
 114 See generally LEADING BY EXAMPLE, supra note 90, at 5−9 (providing a history and 
explanation of key case law under PIPEDA). 
 115 Id. at 6.  The Canadian Federal Court adopted the following test to determine personal 
information at the behest of the Commissioner: “Information will be about an identifiable 
individual where there is a serious possibility that an individual could be identified through 
the use of that information, alone or in combination with other available information.”  Id. 
(quoting Gordon v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2008] F.C.R. 258, para. 34).  
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tenants’ apartments for insurance purposes.116  The photographs revealed 
information about the dwellers’ “likes,” such as musical, art, culinary, and 
other lifestyle choices, and also included unit and building numbers.117  The 
photographs thus violated PIPEDA because they had the potential to link a 
real-live individual with (otherwise generic) personal information.118  The 
photos rendered the individual “identifiable” or “capable of being 
identified,” irrespective of whether the individual was ever actually 
identified.119  
In Facebook’s case, the Commissioner similarly concluded that 
information that individuals post on the site qualifies as identifiable personal 
information under PIPEDA.120  This is because a user’s profile offers 
information about that user’s race, religious and political preferences, and 
habits—all of which are capable of identifying the user.  Moreover, such 
information is linked to an individual’s photo and user ID, which is most 
often their real-world name.  
Once the information in Facebook users’ profiles qualified as personal, 
the next hurdle was to determine whether such information was actually used 
for commercial purposes.  The Commissioner determined that it was.121  She 
explained that even though the site is free for users and users voluntarily post 
information for “purely personal purposes,” such information was also used 
for commercial purposes122 because Facebook uses it to attract revenue from 
third-party advertisers and application developers.123 
[T]hose features of the site that do not have an obvious link to 
its business model are included to enhance the user’s 
experience on Facebook.  Enhancing the experience likely 
encourages existing members to continue to use the site and 
presumably encourages others to join as well—thereby 
indirectly contributing to the success of Facebook as a 
commercial enterprise.  In that sense, collection, use and 
disclosure of personal information in relation to a feature 
without an apparent direct commercial link can still be 
                                                                                                                   
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id.  
 120 DENHAM, supra note 89, para. 11. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id.  
 123 Id. para. 14. 
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characterized as occurring ‘in the course of commercial 
activit[ies]’ in the sense required under the Act.124  
 
Facebook thus qualifies for PIPEDA scrutiny because the information 
users post on the site is “personal,”125 and any allegedly unauthorized 
use, disclosure, or collection of user information occurs in the course 
of “commercial activity.”126 
C.  How Violations Are Caught and Enforced 
The OPC provides oversight and helps to ensure compliance with 
PIPEDA.127  The mission of the OPC is to protect and promote the privacy 
rights of individuals.128  If an individual or group believes its privacy has 
been violated, it can file a written complaint with the Commissioner.129  The 
Commissioner can also initiate a complaint on her own when she believes 
there are reasonable grounds to warrant an investigation.130  The review of 
Facebook occurred because the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest 
Clinic (CIPPIC), a private legal clinic at the University of Ottawa,131 filed a 
complaint with the OPC in May 2008.132    
Once the complaint is filed, the Commissioner conducts an 
investigation.133  Within a year after the original complaint is filed or 
                                                                                                                   
 124 Id. para. 12 (quoting PIPEDA, supra note 26, § 4(1)(a)). 
 125 Id. para. 11. 
 126 Id. 
 127 LEADING BY EXAMPLE, supra note 90, at 2. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id.; see also PIPEDA, supra note 26, § 11(1) (“An individual may file with the 
Commissioner a written complaint against an organization for contravening a provision of 
Division 1 or for not following a recommendation set out in Schedule 1.”). 
 130 LEADING BY EXAMPLE, supra note 90, at 2; PIPEDA, supra note 26, § 11(2) (“If the 
Commissioner is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to investigate a matter under this 
Part, the Commissioner may initiate a complaint in respect of the matter.”); see also 
Information About Privacy Breaches and How to Respond, OFF. PRIVACY COMM’R CAN., 
http://www.priv.gc.ca/resource/pb-avp/pb-avp_intro_e.cfm (last modified Nov. 5, 2008) 
(noting that the Commissioner only initiates an investigation “in exceptional circumstances, 
where, for example, the breach is very serious, appears to be systemic or the organization does 
not appear to be responding adequately”). 
 131 See About Us, CANADIAN INTERNET POL’Y & PUB. INT., http://www.cippic.ca/about-us/ 
(last visited July 25, 2011) (describing the clinic as a student-centered research and advocacy 
establishment on technology-related policy and law reform). 
 132 Letter from Philippa Lawson, Dir., Canadian Internet Policy and Pub. Interest Clinic, to 
Jennifer Stoddart, Privacy Comm’r of Can. (May 30, 2008) (available at http://www.cippic. 
ca/uploads/CIPPICFacebookComplaint_29May08.pdf) [hereinafter CIPPIC Complaint]. 
 133 PIPEDA, supra note 26, § 12(1) (noting also that there are a few exceptions where an 
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initiated, the Commissioner must prepare a report containing her findings 
and recommendations, any settlement reached by the parties, and, if 
appropriate, a request that the organization give notice of any actions taken 
or intended to be taken to implement the Commissioner’s 
recommendations.134  After the Facebook investigation, the Commissioner 
wrote such a report explaining her findings and making recommendations to 
put Facebook in compliance with PIPEDA.135  
The Commissioner’s recommendations are nonbinding,136 yet she may, at 
any reasonable time and with reasonable notice, investigate whether an 
organization is complying with OPC recommendations using the same 
methods PIPEDA grants to conduct the initial investigation.137  If an 
organization is, after a reasonable or set time, not complying with the 
Commissioner’s recommendations, the Commissioner (or the complainant) 
may then turn to federal court for legal enforcement.138  
In Facebook’s case, the Commissioner never actually turned to the federal 
courts, but she came very close after Facebook’s initial refusal to comply 
with her recommendations and its subsequent delay in incorporating 
promised changes.139  The threat of judicial action likely gave the 
Commissioner’s recommendations the force they needed to compel 
Facebook’s compliance efforts.140  
                                                                                                                   
investigation may not be the next step).  
 134 Id. § 13(1). 
 135 See generally DENHAM, supra note 89 (explaining Commissioner’s findings and 
recommendations after the Facebook investigation). 
 136 LEADING BY EXAMPLE, supra note 90, at 2.  
 137 PIPEDA, supra note 26, § 18(1). 
 138 Id. § 16 (“The Court may . . . (a) order an organization to correct its practices . . . (b) 
order an organization to publish a notice of any action . . . to correct its practices . . . and (c) 
award damages to the complainant . . . .”). 
 139 See Carron & Healey, supra note 15, at S9 (“Initially, Facebook resisted complete 
compliance with the Privacy Commissioner’s recommendations.  However, given the 
Commissioner’s ability to submit the matter to the courts, Facebook ultimately proposed 
solutions satisfying Canadian privacy laws.”). 
 140 Id. 
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IV.  HOW CANADA USED PIPEDA TO PUSH FACEBOOK TO IMPROVE USER 
PRIVACY 
A.  Specific Allegations Against Facebook 
The CIPPIC complaint against Facebook contained twenty-four 
allegations of PIPEDA violations.141  “The central issue in CIPPIC’s 
allegations was knowledge and consent . . . [that is,] whether Facebook was 
providing a sufficient knowledge basis for meaningful consent by 
documenting purposes for collecting, using, or disclosing personal 
information and bringing such purposes to individuals’ attention in a 
reasonably direct and transparent way.”142  Of the twenty-four counts, the 
Commissioner dismissed several and Facebook resolved several others.143  
Two unresolved issues were third-party applications and the length of time 
that Facebook stored personal information on current, deceased, and non-
Facebook members.144  Third-party application settings and policies were 
one of the most contentious issues.145 
Regarding Facebook’s third-party policies, the Commissioner said that 
Facebook was “in effect providing third-party application developers with 
the ability to retrieve the personal information of users (and their friends) 
who sign up for the applications.”146  This was problematic for two reasons.   
First, Facebook was not doing enough to obtain meaningful consent from 
users when disclosing their personal information to application developers.147  
PIPEDA Principle 4.3 generally requires individuals’ knowledge and consent 
for the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal information.  
Principle 4.3.2 requires organizations to make reasonable efforts to ensure 
the individual understands how that information will be used.148  Principle 
4.3.2 clarifies that, for consent to be meaningful, “the purposes must be 
                                                                                                                   
 141 See CIPPIC Complaint, supra note 132 (detailing CIPPIC’s allegations against 
Facebook).  
 142 DENHAM, supra note 89, at 3. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id.  
 145 Id. para. 194 (“Facebook objected strenuously to [CIPPIC’s] preliminary treatment of the 
allegations relating to third-party applications.  However, after considering Facebook’s 
objections, [CIPPIC] remains concerned about the issues.”). 
 146 Id. para. 14 (explaining also that “in a traditional model, an organization may subcontract 
parts of its business to third parties (thus transferring personal information to another entity), 
or it may disclose personal information to another company that is purchasing customer lists 
for marketing, for example”). 
 147 Id. at 3.  
 148 PIPEDA, supra note 26, princ. 4.3.2. 
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stated in such a manner that the individual can reasonably understand how 
the information will be used or disclosed.”149  In contravention of Principle 
4.3.2, the Commissioner said Facebook was not informing users of the 
purpose of disclosing their personal information to third-party developers,150 
that it was giving developers more access than they needed to run their 
applications,151 and that it was granting third-party developers access to 
users’ personal information when their friends or members of their network 
added the application without giving adequate notice.152  
Second, “the Assistant Commissioner determined that Facebook did not 
have adequate safeguards in place to prevent unauthorized access by 
application developers to users’ personal information.”153  PIPEDA Principle 
4.7 requires an organization to protect an individual’s personal information 
from unauthorized use or access through “security safeguards appropriate to 
the sensitivity of the information.”154  In violation of Principle 4.7, the site 
was inadequately safeguarding personal information because it did not 
monitor the legitimacy or quality of third-party applications that were 
accessing user data.155 
B.  Facebook’s (Delayed) Response 
After initially refusing to comply with several of the Commissioner’s 
recommendations, Facebook finally agreed to give users more control over 
how much of their personal information was shared by September 2009.156  
Specifically, Facebook agreed to the Commissioner’s recommendation that 
applications only be allowed to access the personal information that users 
consented to disclose.157  By February 2010, however, critics claimed the 
new policies exposed more, not less, user information and the Assistant 
Commissioner indicated that “[s]ome Facebook users are disappointed by 
                                                                                                                   
 149 Id. 
 150 DENHAM, supra note 89, at 94 (indicating that this violated PIPEDA Principles 4.2.2 and 
4.2.5, which require organizations to disclose the purposes for which personal information is 
being collected before it is collected). 
 151 Id. (indicating that this violated PIPEDA Principle 4.4.1, which requires an organization 
to collect only the information necessary for the purposes it has identified). 
 152 Id. at 95 (indicating that this violated PIPEDA Principle 4.3.2, which requires an 
individual’s knowledge and meaningful consent with regards to collection). 
 153 Id. at 3.  
 154 PIPEDA, supra note 26, princ. 4.7. 
 155 DENHAM, supra note 89, at 95. 
 156 Facebook Won’t Face Off with Canada’s Privacy Commissioner, 27 ANDREWS 
COMPUTER & INTERNET LITIG. REP., Sept. 30, 2009, at 11.  
 157 Id. 
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certain changes being made to the site—changes that were supposed to 
strengthen their privacy and the protection of their personal information” in a 
public statement.158  After rumors about the Commissioner turning to the 
federal courts for enforcement, Facebook responded.  On September 22, 
2010, the Commissioner released a statement indicating, “The changes 
Facebook has put in place in response to concerns we raised as part of our 
investigation last year are reasonable and meet the expectations set out under 
Canadian privacy law.”159  
By September 2010, Facebook began to restrict an application from 
accessing user information without getting express consent for each category 
of personal information it wanted to access.160  This is called a “permissions 
model.”161  When users add an application, they are notified that it wants to 
access certain types of information about them, and they can consent to 
sharing that data.162  Facebook also created a panel in each user’s privacy 
settings to reveal which applications have access to which bits of information 
about that user.163  For example, the panel will indicate to a user if the 
application “Pandora” has access to the user’s profile information.  
Information listed in a user’s panel includes religious and political views, 
education history, work history, and Facebook Status, as well as a user’s 
family and relationships, photos and videos, and all of the user’s friends’ 
personal information to which the user has access.164  
The post-September 2010 privacy model still requires users to share 
personal information with an application before using it and there is no 
longer an opt-out option as there was before December 2009.165  Users are, 
however, allowed to opt-out of the Facebook Platform entirely.166  By 
turning off the Platform, users are no longer able to use any applications, but 
they can at least avoid sharing any information with them.167   
                                                                                                                   
 158 Randall Palmer, Canada Investigates Facebook Again over Privacy, REUTERS (Jan. 28, 
2010), http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/01/27/us-facebook-canada-idINTRE60Q6M220100127 
(emphasis added). 
 159 Statement, Jennifer Stoddart, Canadian Privacy Comm’r (Sept. 22, 2010) [hereinafter 
Stoddart Statement], available at http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2010/nr-c_100922_e.cfm. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Apps Settings, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/settings/?tab=applications (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2010) (document on file with author). 
 164 Id. 
 165 See supra Part II.B (explaining the evolution of Facebook’s privacy policies regarding 
applications before and after December 2009).  
 166 Zuckerberg, supra note 76. 
 167 Id. 
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Though the Commissioner was satisfied with these improvements and 
others, she emphasized, “to be clear, I am only speaking about those issues 
[related to the investigation] rather than the site as a whole.”168  Since her 
investigation concluded, the Commissioner has been investigating several 
other complaints.169  There have also been several other developments in 
Facebook’s privacy narrative that reveal Facebook’s PIPEDA compliance is 
not as meaningful as it could be. 
V.  WHY FACEBOOK’S PIPEDA COMPLIANCE IS SUPERFICIAL AND HOW IT 
COULD BE MEANINGFUL 
A.  Red Flag Immediately Following Commissioner’s “OK” of Facebook 
Remarkably, roughly three weeks after the Commissioner completed her 
Facebook investigation, the Wall Street Journal reported on October 18, 
2010 that Facebook applications had been leaking users’ Facebook ID 
numbers to outside marketers and tracking companies.170  Specifically, many 
applications that had access to user information were sharing users’ names 
and, in some incidences, their friends’ names, with dozens of Internet 
tracking and advertising companies.171  The ten most popular applications 
were implicated.172  The breach affected tens of millions of users, including 
those whose profiles were set to the strictest privacy settings.173  
The leak occurred via referers, or bits of information that are sent when a 
user of one website clicks a link to another website.174  The referer informs 
the new website from which website a user is arriving.175  This practice is 
                                                                                                                   
 168 Stoddart Statement, supra note 159. 
 169 Facebook Investigation Follow-up Complete, OFF. PRIVACY COMM’R CAN., http://www. 
priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2010/bg_100922_e.cfm (“[T]he Office has received several further 
complaints about issues that were not part of the initial investigation . . . . As a result of those 
complaints, the Office has opened investigations that are examining Facebook’s invitation 
feature (the process by which Facebook suggests friends to new users) and Facebook social 
plug-ins (the Facebook ‘Like’ buttons that other websites can add to their sites).”). 
 170 Steel & Fowler, supra note 48. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. (indicating that implicated applications include FarmVille, Texas Holdem Poker, and 
FrontierVille, and that three of the applications, including FarmVille, were sharing personal 
information about users’ friends). 
 173 Id. 
 174 Geoffrey A. Fowler & Emily Steel, Referers: How Facebook Apps Leak User IDs, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/10/18/referers-how-facebook-apps-lea 
k-user-ids/. 
 175 Id. 
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standard across the Internet and helps websites analyze the sources of their 
traffic and customize their information.176  Privacy is also generally not a 
problem, because the referer information is not linked to any user’s 
identity.177  In the Facebook context, however, a referer may allow 
companies to connect otherwise “anonymous” data “ ‘to the very non-
anonymous Facebook User ID, which is linked back to [one’s] real-world 
name and identity.’ ”178  
The leak violated Facebook’s own policies that prohibit applications from 
sharing personal information about users with outside companies.179  Its 
mechanics illustrate Facebook’s unique and heightened responsibilities to 
protect user information relative to its online counterparts like MySpace.  It 
also demonstrates that the issues the Commissioner sought to address in 
2009—proper safeguards for data and user control over information—have 
not been meaningfully resolved.   
A similar breach occurred when Facebook transmitted user IDs to 
advertisers in May 2010.180  At the time, Facebook would not acknowledge 
that the user ID was personally identifiable information but promised to 
redevelop software to protect user data.181  This “repeat-offense” in 
October—just weeks after the Commissioner ended her investigation—is a 
reminder that Facebook cannot be relied on to meaningfully self-correct or 
regulate without legal pressure.   
B.  The Path to Meaningful Compliance 
Outside legal authorities like the Commissioner must police Facebook to 
ensure that it sets and follows its own policies to protect user privacy.  The 
PIPEDA principles of accountability, limiting use and disclosure, and 
safeguarding sensitive personal information are ideal privacy guidelines for 
Facebook and are epitomized by an opt-in privacy model.182  The following 
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recommendations create a blueprint for Facebook to move closer to an opt-in 
model by meaningfully complying with PIPEDA. 
1.  Recommendation I: Ask Permission Before Adding Information-
Sharing Features 
First, Facebook should not add new information-sharing features to user 
accounts without asking permission.183  In its 2008 complaint against 
Facebook, CIPPIC alleged the site was not informing users when their 
personal information was being collected, used, or disclosed for new 
purposes in violation of PIPEDA Principle 4.2.4.184  This Principle states, 
“When personal information that has been collected is to be used for a 
purpose not previously identified, the new purpose shall be identified prior to 
use.  Unless the new purpose is required by law, the consent of the individual 
is required before information can be used for that purpose.”185  In other 
words, both a “new purpose” and failure to obtain consent must be present 
for a violation of Principle 4.2.4. 
At the time of the Commissioner’s investigation, CIPPIC did not offer 
any evidence of instances when Facebook violated PIPEDA Principle 
4.2.4.186  As a result, the Commissioner dismissed this particular allegation 
as not well-founded, explaining, “In the absence of any evidence . . . I am at 
present unable to find Facebook to be in contravention of the Act in this 
regard.”187  
The Instant Personalization application, however, is likely a valid 
example of a new information-sharing feature that uses personal information 
“for a purpose not previously identified”188 because it exports information 
from Facebook to third-party websites previously unaffiliated with 
Facebook.189  Instant Personalization was not examined in the 
Commissioner’s investigation because the application was launched after the 
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Commissioner completed her review.190 The application likely qualifies as a 
new use of a user’s personal information under Principle 4.2.4 of PIPEDA, 
and because Facebook added the application automatically without user 
consent, it likely contravenes Principle 4.2.4.   
Asking user permission before adding a new feature like Instant 
Personalization, or any application that increases information sharing, will 
align Facebook with PIPEDA’s requirement that an organization procure an 
individual’s permission before putting that individual’s personal information 
to new uses.  
2.  Recommendation II: More Meaningful Disclosure in the Third-Party 
Context 
Asking user permission, as suggested above, is only effective when users 
are given enough information to make informed decisions.  As of October 6, 
2010, Facebook’s control panel allows users to see which applications have 
access to which pieces of information about them.191  The application privacy 
settings page also indicates to users when an application accesses that 
information.192  This page, however, does not provide a comprehensive or 
clear picture of exactly how, why, or how frequently user information is 
used.193 
PIPEDA Principle 4.3.2 notes that an organization must “make a 
reasonable effort to ensure that the individual is advised of the purposes for 
which the information will be used” and that “[t]o make the consent 
meaningful, the purposes must be stated in such a manner that the individual 
can reasonably understand how the information will be used or 
disclosed.”194  
Under these criteria, Facebook’s application control panel is not a 
meaningful source of information unless users also have access to how and 
why their data is being used by applications.  The current control panel does 
not offer this information.  For example, the panel does not indicate to users 
the information that a user’s friends’ applications have accessed about that 
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user.195  Privacy advocates have termed this phenomenon the “app gap”—the 
fact that your friend’s applications get access to your information even if you 
have never used nor installed the application.196  Thus, users who take the 
time to examine their application privacy settings may think they 
“reasonably understand”197 exactly who (or what) is accessing their 
information, but they are missing this critical piece of the puzzle.  
Giving users a more comprehensive and accurate picture of how much 
information they are sharing with applications will include a panel that 
indicates how much information is going to the applications their friends 
have installed.  It will list users’ friends’ applications, and tell users which 
bits of information those applications are accessing.  Finally, in addition to 
telling users which applications can access which information about them, a 
comprehensive panel will tell users how often their information is accessed 
and exactly how it is used.  Providing such information allows users to make 
more informed choices when deciding whether to use applications on the 
Platform.  Enabling such informed decision-making is key to meaningful 
compliance with PIPEDA Principle 4.3.2 on obtaining user consent.  
Although many users may not go through the trouble of looking at the 
details to determine which application is accessing what information about 
them, making such statistics publicly accessible will act as a deterrent to 
over-sharing by applications (either by design or by accident) as happened in 
the November 2010 application leak incident.198   
3.  Recommendation III: More User Control in the Third-Party Context 
Users should also be given more control over what information they share 
with applications.  Without turning off the Facebook Platform entirely, users 
are currently unable to block applications from accessing their information to 
varying degrees,199 although the option existed prior to December 2009.200  
According to Facebook’s policies as of January 2011, “apps and websites 
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you and your friends use already have access to your name, profile picture, 
gender, networks, friend list, user ID, username, and any other information 
you share with everyone.”201 
In practice, this list of information available to applications is quite 
extensive.  For example, to use the application “Graffiti,” a nifty feature 
which allows a user to “spray paint” pictures or messages and post them on 
friends’ walls, a user must allow the application to access her basic 
information (full name, profile picture, gender, networks, user ID, and list of 
friends); profile information (music, movies, books, quotes, activities, 
interests, groups, events, notes, birthday, hometown, current city, websites, 
religious views, political views, education history, work history, and 
Facebook status); family and relationships (significant other and relationship 
details, family members, and relationship status); photos and videos in which 
the user appears (whether those photos are originally posted by the Graffiti 
user or one of her friends); and, finally, her friends’ information (including 
all information listed above that the user has access to about her friends).202  
The Graffiti application can also detect a user’s online presence (i.e., 
whenever the user is signed in) and send emails directly to that user’s 
personal email address.203   
Given the imbalance of the tradeoff—an extensive array of personal 
details in exchange for electronic spray paint—this information sharing may 
violate PIPEDA Principle 4.3.3 that “[a]n organization shall not, as a 
condition of the supply of a product or service, require an individual to 
consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of information beyond that 
required to fulfil the explicitly specified, and legitimate purposes.”204  
Subsection 5(3) also requires such personal information only be collected for 
“purposes that a  reasonable person would consider are appropriate in the 
circumstances.”205 
Giving an application access to a user’s likes, hobbies, or social groups 
may indeed be a legitimate use of user information, as it could help software 
developers to better define their target audiences and tailor their applications 
accordingly.  Access to a user’s relationship status, photographs, videos, and 
family members, though, may be unnecessarily excessive and in 
contravention of the “legitimate purposes” requirement of Principle 4.3.3.206  
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Facebook could counter that, irrespective of how “reasonable”207 or 
extensive the tradeoff, users are still knowingly making the decision to 
provide their information and get something in return.  Facebook could argue 
that the user is aware of the deal, as the information available to the 
application is “explicitly specified”208 as required by Principle 4.3.3, and the 
user gives permission before any information sharing occurs.  So this aspect 
of third-party sharing—when users make an explicit tradeoff with a specific 
application they wish to use—may not be alone sufficient to violate 
PIPEDA.  
The case for a PIPEDA violation is more compelling, though, because 
other applications also gain access to user information even when users are 
not signed up or have not explicitly agreed to use them.209  As long as a user 
has not disabled the Platform feature entirely, even applications a user has 
not signed up for can still see some of that user’s information.  So even if a 
user’s application privacy settings are set to the maximum possible and he 
has never even used an application before,210 that user cannot keep 
applications from seeing information that is publicly available to fellow 
Facebook users.211  If a user’s friend uses the Graffiti application, for 
example, that application can then access any information that the friend can 
see about the user.212   
As of January 2011, there is a tab on the application privacy page that 
gives users some control over what information their friends’ applications 
can access about them.213  If users click onto the “Info Accessible Through 
Your Friends” option, they should see eighteen checked boxes, each 
representing a bit of their own personal information.214  Assuming users 
make it to this point in the privacy controls process, they then have the 
opportunity to manually uncheck each of the eighteen boxes so that their 
friends’ applications cannot have access to these eighteen categories of 
information.215  However, users will then read three lines of text at the 
bottom of the page explaining the parts of information they cannot control 
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access to: “your name, profile picture, gender, networks and user ID (along 
with any other information you’ve set to everyone)” because that information 
“is available to friends’ applications unless you turn off platform applications 
and websites.”216  
In the words of the Commissioner, “One of the key concepts of 
[PIPEDA] is that of one’s control of their personal information.”217  To better 
comply with this fundamental PIPEDA concept, Facebook should give users 
more meaningful control over their personal information.  Rather than the 
all-or-nothing option of either turning off the Platform or submitting to 
extensive sharing with third parties, the site should offer a middle ground.  
Users should only have to share information with the applications they are 
actually using, not with applications generally or the applications of their 
friends.  When a user is sharing information with an application, the user 
should have more input regarding how much information the application 
uses, and applications should be limited to accessing information that truly 
enables them to better provide a service to their users.  Details like 
“Relationship Status” and photos from the user’s most recent holiday party 
are likely unnecessary bits of information.  Giving users more control over 
their personal data comports with the “legitimate purposes” requirement of 
PIPEDA Principle 4.3.3, and also with the “reasonable expectations of the 
individual” under Principle 4.3.5. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Canada has played an instrumental role in the global pushback against 
over-sharing by Facebook.  Given the strength of its privacy laws and the 
resolve of its current Commissioner, though, Canada can do more.  Facebook 
has still not meaningfully complied with PIPEDA in letter or in spirit, and 
thus the Commissioner should re-launch an investigation pushing for more 
holistic changes to the Facebook site.  Namely, she should demand the site 
shift closer to an opt-in information-sharing structure that enables users to 
choose when and what they want to share, rather than the current opt-out 
model that allows the site to assume users’ consent to share everything.  This 
can be achieved by offering individual users more specific control over what 
information is publicly available by default, and by increasing disclosure so 
users better understand how their information is being used before they make 
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information-sharing decisions.  Urging an opt-in privacy mode for Facebook 
keeps with the spirit of PIPEDA and the current movement in Canada to 
encourage “privacy by design” by making users’ personal data private by 
default.218  It will also, as it did in 2009, give Canada the chance to tackle a 
global problem with global ramifications for Facebook’s 750 million plus 
users around the world. 
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